简介：TheemergenceofB2Belectronicmarketshasgreatlychangedtherelativebargainingpowerofbuyersandsellers.Westudytheequilibriummarketstructureinabuyer’smarket.Wefindthatbuyer-controlledB2BmarketsandneutralB2Bmarketshavedifferentequilibriumstructures,andtheemergenceofB2Bmarketswillincreasesocialwelfare,butitseffectonbuyersandsellerswillbedifferent:B2Bmarketsincreasetheconsumersurplusoftheendmarket,buttheireffectsonbuyerandsellerprofitsaremoderatedbytherelativebargainingpowerofbuyersandsellers.TheprofitsofthesidewithmuchweakerbargainingpowerwilldecreaseduetotheintroductionofB2Bmarkets.

简介：Thepaperstudieschannelchoicedecisionsinamulti-channelsupplychainunderastrategywherethereisanex-antecommitmentmadeontheretailpricemarkup.Themarketdemandisuncertainanddependentonthepriceandsalesefforts.Theresultsshowthatinanychannelstructure,whenmakingorderdecisionstheretaileronlyexaminesthepriceratioandthefluctuationsizeofrandomdemand,ratherthanthechannelcostandtheretailer’smarketingefficiency.Whentheretailpricerises,themanufactureriswillingtoincreaseinventoryquantityfordirectsales,becausethemanufacturer’sprofitmarginishigherindirectchannel.Theincreaseindemandfluctuationonlyaffectsthedegreeofchannelpreferencebutdoesn’tchangethemanufacturer’schannelchoice.Nomatterinwhichlevelthepriceratiois,whenthesalesefficiencyofretailchannelisnothighorthedemandproportionofdirectchannelislow,themanufacturerandtheretailerwillbebothapttochooseadual-channelstructure.Thenaddingadirectchannelbecomesamarketingstrategy,ratherthanacompetitoroftheretailchannel,andhelpsthesupplychainwinmoremarketdemand.