简介:Anewsituationhasemergedasaresultofglobalclimatechangefollowingthe'ParisAgreement',whichgivesrisetonewopportunitiesforcarbonmarket.Carbonmarketasamechanismtopromotelow-carbondevelopmenthasbeenexploredbothintheoreticalresearchandpracticalapplicationhomeandabroadforseveralyears.However,therearestillmanyproblemstosettle,suchasthepotentialuncertaintytodetermineanddistributetotalcarbonemissions,pricedistortionsinhigh-carbonproductsandservicesinthemarket,mainbodiesresponsibleforthecarbonemissioninurbaninfrastructure,etc.Allthesehaveformedaconstraintonthefurtherdevelopmentofcarbonmarket.Throughthehistoricalanalysisoftheactualdevelopmentofthecarbonmarket,thispapertriestoidentifypracticalproblemswhichshouldbesolvedurgently,andprovidesideasforChinatoestablishaunifiednationalcarbonmarketin2017,whichisnotonlythenationalmeasurestoparticipateinthe'ParisAgreement'actively,butalsotheimplementationofChina’ssustainabledevelopmentstrategy.
简介:Confrontingthecontradictionbetweentherapiddevelopmentofeconomyandtheeffectiveprotectionofenvironment,anddevelopinglowcarboneconomybyoptimizingtheindustrialstructurehavebecomeoneoftheeffectivewaytoattractmoreattention.Inthepaper,wemadearesearchonthecorrelationbetweenchina’sthreemainindustriesandcarbonemissionintensitytofindoutthemainfactorswhichaffecttheintensityofcarbonemissioninChinabymeasuringthegrossemissioninchina’s28mainprovincesin2003-2013andusingGreycorrelationanalysisbasedonthechangetendency.Theresultsindicatethatthesecondindustryhasthelargestcorrelationwithcarbonemissionintensity;thetertiaryindustryhelpsreducetheintensityofcarbonemission,butitisnotveryobvious;thefirstindustryhastheleastimpactoncarbonemissionintensity.Inthelastpart,accordingtothecharacteristicsofindustrialstructureandcarbonemission,weputforwardthesuggestionsandstrategiesontheadjustmentofchina’sindustrialstructureinfuturewiththeresultsanalysis.
简介:美国非营利组织GreenWave主管布伦·斯密斯描述未来的农业场景:人类的耕作地点从陆地转向海洋,用锚定在海床上的绳索饲养牡蛎,贻贝,蛤蜊和海藻。这一想法并非天方夜谭。随着陆地耕作的问题愈加突出——农业耕作带来的温室气体排放越来越严重——和海洋过度捕捞,人类需要开发新的食物来源。GreenWave的海藻农场提供了一种可行的方案:农场
简介:WiththedeepeningofelectricpowermarketreforminChina,themonopolyedgeofthestate-ownedelectricpowerenterpriseswilllose.Onthebasisoftheexistingpostperformancesalarymechanism,ChinesepowerenterprisesneedtooptimizetheincentivemechanismofR&Dstaff,toarousetheR&Dstaff’senthusiasmandcreativity,toadapttothenewmarketcompetitionandfurtherimprovemarketvalue.WhilsttheincentivemechanismoptimizingprocessingneedstoconsidernotonlythechangingmarketenvironmentbutalsothepersonalandworkingcharacteristicsofR&Dstaff.ThispapersummarizesthecharacteristicsofthecurrentChinesepowerenterprises’R&Dstaff:staff’stheoryqualityishigh,butinsensitivetothemarket;theyareconfrontedwithheavyworkloadanddiversifiedjobchoices;managerscanobservetheirbehaviorchoicesornot;besides,theprocessofR&DiscomplexandthemarketreactionsofR&Dachievementsareuncertain.Basedonthepremiseoftheabovefeatures,twoincentivemodelsareestablishedinthispaperfromthepointofviewofenterprisemanagers.Oneisforthesituationwhenstaff’sbehaviorchoicescanbeobserved;theotherisforthesituationwhenstaff’sbehaviorchoicescannotbeobserved.Throughsolvingthemodel,weanalyzetheoptimizationpathofelectricpowerenterprisesR&Dstaffincentivemechanismundertheseconditions:(1)whenstaff’sbehaviorchoicescanbeobserved,managerscanpaymoretotheR&Dstaffwhodevelopproductswithhigheroutputvalue,inordertoencouragethemtoworkharder.(2)whenstaff’sbehaviorchoicescannotbeobserved,managersshouldtakereasonablestrategiesaccordingtothedifferentsituations:a.whenR&DstaffincentivetotallydependonthemarketvalueoftheR&Dachievements,managersshouldallocateworkloadrationallyaccordingtotheirdifferenttechnicallevels;b.whenthemarketreactionsofR&Dresultsbecomemoreprecarious,managersneedtoreducetheincentiveintensitywhichbasedonthemarketvalueandraisetheirfixe
简介:
简介:
简介:Sincethereformandopeningup,thelocalgovernmenthasplayedakeyroleinpromotingtheeconomicandsocialdevelopmentofourcountry,andtheeffectiveimplementationofthelocalgovernmenthasbecomeanimportantresearchtopic.Therefore,basedontheliterature,theobservationmethodofin-depthinterviews,practiceinvestigationandparticipationisadoptedinthispaper,whichfocusesontheimplementationofspecialgroupsofsocialassistancepolicy.Thetheoreticalframeworkofgovernment’rationalchoicerevealsthestatusoflocalgovernmentimplementationpoliciesandbehaviorbehindthemechanismandorganizationalstructure.Thestudyfoundthat:(1)thelocalgovernmentiseasytochooseaquantifiablepolicytoimplement;(2)thereisacoexistencebetweenthelocalgovernmentdepartments;(3)thelocalgovernmentselectivelymeetstheneedsofspecialpersonnel;(4)thelocalgovernment’sseekingpoliticalpromotionandpowerleadstoitsbehavioralienation.
简介:Thispaperconstructstheindexsystembymeansofquantitativeanalysis.WechoosethecoordinationdegreeofYunnanprovincefrom2012to2015.TheregionalculturalandeconomicdevelopmentinYunnan’sfrontierareanalyzedsothatwecanprovidethereferenceforthesustainabledevelopmentofYunnan’sfrontierandrealizethecoordinateddevelopmentofcultureinYunnan’sfrontierandeconomicsysteminorder.TheresultsshowthatthecultureandeconomyinYunnan’sfrontierarecoupledwithformationofthecoordinateddevelopmentofcultureandeconomy;economicdevelopmentisthemainreasontopromotethecoordinateddevelopmentofcultureandeconomyinYunnan’sfrontier,anditcontributestothemainforceofimprovingthecoordinateddevelopmentofevolutiontypes;thecoordinateddevelopmentdegreeoftheoveralllevelislowandstillintheChina’sbackwardlevel.