摘要
Byusingageneralizedfitness-dependentMoranprocess,anevolutionarymodelforsymmetric2×2gamesinawell-mixedpopulationwithafinitesizeisinvestigated.Inthemodel,theindividuals’payoffaccumulatingfromgamesismappedintofitnessusinganexponentfunction.Bothselectionstrengthβandmutationrateεareconsidered.Theprocessisanergodicbirth-deathprocess.Basedonthelimitdistributionoftheprocess,wegivetheanalysisresultsforwhichstrategywillbefavouredwhenεissmallenough.Theresultsdependonnotonlythepayoffmatrixofthegame,butalsoonthepopulationsize.Especially,weprovethatnaturalselectionfavoursthestrategywhichisrisk-dominantwhenthepopulationsizeislargeenough.Forarbitraryβandεvalues,the’Hawk-Dove’gameandthe’Coordinate’gameareusedtoillustrateourmodel.Wegivetheevolutionarystablestrategy(ESS)ofthegamesandcomparetheresultswiththoseofthereplicatordynamicsintheinfinitepopulation.Theresultsaredeterminedbysimulationexperiments.
出版日期
2011年03月13日（中国期刊网平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）
